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TRUTH COMMISSIONS: BETWEEN IMPUNITY AND PROSECUTION
TRANSCRIPT OF THE FREDERICK K. COX INTERNATIONAL LAW CENTER
LECTURE IN GLOBAL LEGAL REFORM *
Judge Thomas Buergenthal t
TRANSCRIPT."
Before speaking about truth commissions in general, I thought you
might be interested in hearing about my participation in one such en-
tity-the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador. This is how it
all began. In November 1991, while attending a human rights conference in
Norway, I received a call from the office of the UN Secretary-General in
New York. The caller explained that the Secretary-General wished to name
me to the United Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador that would be
established shortly. Would I accept the appointment? As I listened to the
caller, I looked out of the window of the Oslo conference center where we
were meeting; the icy rain continued to fall and the cold I had been nursing
in Oslo for the past few days was getting worse. All I could think of at that
moment was the tropical climate of El Salvador. I immediately accepted the
appointment without so much as asking all the right questions one is sup-
posed to ask on such occasions.
That is how I became a member of the UN Truth Commission for
El Salvador. It turned out to be one of the most important, albeit heart-
wrenching, assignments I have ever had. The Peace Agreement between the
Government of El Salvador and the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Lib-
eration Front), the insurgents in that conflict, was signed in 1991. It put an
end to the twelve-year long civil war that had brutalized this small Central
American country and caused the deaths of thousands of innocent people,
among them Archbishop Oscar Romero of San Salvador. There had been
some large-scale massacres, including the massacre at El Mozote, where
more than five hundred people, mostly women and children, were killed by
government forces. But the government did not have a monopoly on human
- Judge Thomas Buergenthal delivered this lecture on October 17, 2006 at Case Western
Reserve University School of Law. A webcast of the event is available at http://www.law.
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rights violations; the insurgents, too, were guilty of many serious violations.
All in all, it is probably also true that many more innocent human beings
than combatants became the victims of the conflict. That is frequently the
case in such conflicts.
The UN Truth Commission for El Salvador consisted of three
Commissioners. Our chairman was Belisario Betancur, a former President
of Colombia. Reinaldo Figueredo, a former Foreign Minister of Venezuela,
and I were the two remaining members. Some people who knew of my prior
service as judge and president of the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, joked that the Commission was composed of two politicians and a
judge to keep them honest; others warned me that the politicians would play
the games politicians are wont to play and that I would find myself in an
impossible position. I need not have worried. My two colleagues turned out
to be unreservedly committed to establishing the truth; we worked together
extremely well, came to trust each other fully, and became good friends.
Our mandate required us to investigate all major human rights vio-
lations that had been committed in El Salvador during its civil war and to
make recommendations to help the country achieve reconciliation. Immedi-
ately on taking office, we hired an executive director and a staff of some
twenty-five young lawyers, sociologists and forensic anthropologists from
various countries in Latin America, the U.S. and Europe, and moved into
rented offices in San Salvador. We spent the first few weeks in El Salvador
meeting with the political and civic leaders of the country, with the leader-
ship of the guerilla movement, editors of the country's leading newspapers
and media outlets, church and labor union representatives, military com-
manders, NGO representatives, and members of different political parties.
These meetings were designed to allow us to hear what Salvadorans had to
say about their sad past and how they saw the future of the country. This
was our way of feeling the post-conflict pulse of El Salvador.
To begin our fact-finding efforts, we flooded the country with an-
nouncements, inviting the population to provide the Truth Commission with
information about what happened to them, their families or friends during
the armed conflict. Besides sending our staff into the countryside to inter-
view witnesses, we traveled to the major massacre sites, met with survivors
and inspected the work being carried out by of our forensic anthropologists.
We also visited those regions of the country where much of the heavy fight-
ing had taken place. We subpoenaed military officers and guerilla com-
manders and examined them about their activities during the conflict. And
we sought information from the U.S. Government, which had supported the
Salvadoran government during the civil war. We also interviewed various
NGOs who had investigated human rights violations in El Salvador at dif-
ferent times of the conflict.
During the first three months of our investigation, we had very little
success in getting much information. People were afraid to testify, particu-
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larly against the military and security forces because the government which
had conducted the war was still in power, with its military and police infra-
structure intact. The insurgents also were still in control in their strongholds
in the countryside and did not look kindly on being accused of having killed
or tortured people. Both sides, of course, had good reasons for keeping the
truth from us. People were not only scared to testify, they also did not be-
lieve that our findings would be any more honest than those produced by the
investigations the government had carried out from time to time, mainly
under U.S. pressure. That meant that we had to convince the population that
we were serious and would present an honest report. We also had to find
ways to protect those who were willing to talk and realized that to get wit-
nesses to come forward, we had to guarantee them full confidentiality. As a
result, clandestine meetings with witnesses had to be arranged outside our
offices, particularly when military officers or insurgents agreed to testify
against their superiors. Some of these meetings were scary cloak and dagger
operations. Specialists from the UN periodically swept our offices for hid-
den microphones, and our radio was always on when we received sensitive
testimony that we did not want to be overheard.
These and similar efforts began to pay off at the end of our first
three-month stay in the country. People began to talk, and more and more
witnesses came forward to tell their stories. Over time, we were able to con-
vince people that we could be trusted and would make every effort to pro-
tect our witnesses. Gradually they could also see that we were committed to
reporting the truth about the large-scale violations of human rights that had
been committed in El Salvador and to do so regardless of whether the perpe-
trators were members of the insurgency or government forces.
At the end of the eight-month period assigned to us, we presented
our findings to the UN Secretary-General, describing the horrendous events
that had taken place in the country. We dealt with the causes of the conflict
and indicated which side-the Government or the insurgents-was respon-
sible for each of the serious violations we described in the report. Whenever
we had the necessary evidence, we identified the individuals responsible for
these violations, that is, we named names. We also recommended a series of
measures we believed were necessary to facilitate reconciliation.
The UN Truth Commission for El Salvador was just one of a num-
ber of such institutions that have been established during the past three dec-
ades. I knew little about these commissions until I served on one and began
to study their history, composition, modus operandi, and where they fit into
the institutional framework of international mechanisms for the protection
of human rights. To understand the functions they perform, it is necessary to
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relate their role to that of other contemporary institutions perform that deal
with human rights issues. Let me do that now.
As you know, since the Second World War the international com-
munity has created a large number of institutions that seek to protect and
promote human rights in different ways. At one end of the spectrum are
international human rights tribunals. They try states for violations of inter-
national human rights law committed or tolerated by their governments. At
the other end of the spectrum are international criminal tribunals. Their task
is to try individuals charged with those violations of human rights and inter-
national humanitarian law that constitute international crimes and give rise
to individual responsibility. These crimes include, but are not limited to,
genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes.
Today there exist only three human rights courts in the world--4he
European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights, and the relatively new African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights.
In addition to these three regional courts--as yet there does not exist a
worldwide human rights court--there are numerous international and re-
gional institutions of a quasi-judicial, investigatory and reporting character,
among them the UN Human Rights Committee and the new UN Human
Rights Council.
The existing international mechanisms for trying individuals
charged with massive violations of human rights and humanitarian law con-
sist of one permanent universal tribunal-the recently established Interna-
tional Criminal Court--and a handful of ad hoc tribunals. These ad hoc
judicial bodies were created to deal with international crimes that were
committed in certain parts of the world prior to the establishment of the
permanent International Criminal Court. The two best known ad hoc tribu-
nals are the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda. We tend to forget, in this
connection, that the Nuremberg War Crimes Tribunal was also an ad hoc
tribunal.
Where do truth commissions fit into this picture? In terms of their
functions, they stand half-way between international human rights bodies
and international criminal tribunals, for they deal both with human rights
violations committed by governments and by individuals. But they are nei-
ther judicial nor quasi-judicial bodies. Truth commissions are fact-finding
bodies set up for the specific purpose of investigating serious violations of
human rights and humanitarian law committed in a country during an inter-
nal armed conflict or a particularly repressive regime. Their mandates differ
greatly, depending upon the nature of the conflict they are charged with
investigating. Some truth commissions are empowered to assign individual
responsibility for serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law,
that is, naming names; others are denied that power. As a rule, truth com-
missions are also mandated to propose methods for the compensation of the
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victims of these violations and/or to recommend measures designed to bring
about national reconciliation. Some truth commissions have been authorized
to recommend the prosecution of major offenders, others have been em-
powered to offer immunity from prosecution if the offenders confess their
guilt and ask for forgiveness. That was true of the South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, for example.
Three different types of truth commissions, depending on their
composition, have come into being over the years: national truth commis-
sions, mixed commissions and international commissions. The best known
national truth commission was the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission. Similar national commissions had previously been established
in Argentina and Chile to investigate the massive violations of human rights
that had been committed in these countries while their military regimes
were in power. The best known mixed truth commission was the Guatema-
lan Historical Clarification Commission, which consisted of a foreign
chairman and two Guatemalan nationals. It was established pursuant to the
terms of an agreement negotiated under UN auspices between the Govern-
ment of Guatemala and the insurgent forces. Truth Commissions, composed
entirely of foreign nationals, are rare. The best known one was the United
Nations Truth Commission for El Salvador on which I served.
What are the advantages or disadvantages of having national,
mixed, or international truth commissions? The question cannot be an-
swered in the abstract since it will depend on the individual country and its
political climate. A national commission established by consensus among
all major political groups will, as a rule, enjoy national legitimacy and be
able to count on broad support for its findings and recommendations. But
when such a consensus is lacking and the composition of the commission is
controversial, it will lack the credibility it needs to make a difference. This
will be true in countries where the prior regime or its leadership still exer-
cises power or controls the security services. The establishment of an inter-
national commission will frequently make sense for a small country, where
the population continues to be politically polarized. Here it may be difficult
to find even a small group of nationals of the country the population would
trust to be impartial. This was the situation in El Salvador and explains why
the parties to the Salvadoran peace agreement preferred to have only for-
eigners comprise their truth commission. Mixed commissions have the ad-
vantage that their foreign members will be able to draw on their national
colleagues for an understanding of the historical, political, and social con-
text of the conflict. But mixed commissions also have disadvantages similar
to those of national commissions. Unless their national members are seen by
the population at large as truly non-partisan, the commission will have diffi-
culties gathering the information it needs to prepare a credible report be-
cause it will not be trusted.
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Truth commissions exercise what I would call macro fact-finding
functions. They investigate conflicts that produced large-scale violations of
human rights and/or humanitarian law. International criminal courts, by
contrast, engage in micro fact-finding functions and adjudication of specific
criminal charges. Depending upon the context, a truth commission can pro-
vide reliable information about widespread violations of human rights, in-
cluding genocide, disappearances, extrajudicial executions, torture and
rapes, conditions in detention camps, and massacres. It can identify the mili-
tary or insurgent units responsible for these acts. Truth commissions can
also explore the causes, political or otherwise, that produced the conflict and
provide a comprehensive historical overview of these events. Such histories
can promote national reconciliation by settling long-festering disagreements
about disputed charges and countercharges. They can recommend the pay-
ment of compensation to various categories of victims, public trials of the
alleged perpetrators, and amnesties.
International criminal courts play a much more limited, but no less
important role. Their function is to establish individual criminal responsibil-
ity and impose appropriate punishment. Their judgments have practical and
symbolic value: they exact retribution, stigmatize the conduct that resulted
in the punishment, and serve as deterrents by warning potential offenders of
the likely consequences of the criminal actions they might be contemplat-
ing. Judicial decisions also send a message that the international community
considers the acts committed to be criminal, politically unacceptable, and
morally reprehensible.
Only in the rarest of cases, though, are international courts, whether
criminal or human rights tribunals, able to provide a comprehensive histori-
cal overview of the events that transpired in a country and of the causes that
precipitated the crimes or violations they produced. International criminal
courts are also not in a position to try more than a limited number of offend-
ers. In Rwanda, for example, some one hundred thousand individuals alleg-
edly took part in the genocides. No international court could try that many
defendants in any reasonable period of time. Because the focus of courts is
person-specific, their approach to the facts before them must of necessity be
narrower than that of truth commissions whose mandates are broader.
Courts, of course, are also not well equipped to make policy recommenda-
tions; truth commission are.
But truth commissions are not judicial bodies. They lack the power
to try, convict and sentence persons accused of criminal offenses. A truth
commission is able to make factual findings based on its investigations and,
if given that power, it can also identify those individuals it considers re-
sponsible for criminal acts, but only a court can try them and impose the
requisite criminal sanctions. Frequently, though, the findings of truth com-
missions can settle long unresolved political controversies about individual
and group responsibility for the crimes that were committed. Without such
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findings, national reconciliation, particularly after a bloody civil war, is
seldom possible. The conviction of a few individuals by a court is unlikely
to achieve that objective.
These considerations lead me to believe that it would be useful in
many post-conflict situations to supplement the work of international courts
with the findings and recommendations of truth commissions. I realize that
there are practical problems involving due process and various evidentiary
issues that may make it difficult to have both a court and a truth commission
deal with one and the same conflict situation. But these problems are not
insurmountable. In many instances a truth commission and a court, working
either side-by-side or in tandem, can come up with findings that will enable
a country to put the past behind it without sweeping the truth under the rug.
Reconciliation is possible only when a society has reason to believe that it
has purged itself of the impunity that ruled its past.

